Honduras Update

So the U.S. has decided to do the right thing and recognize the Honduran elections. Good. That actually is a step towards resolving this crisis.

Honduras Update

The latest deal has broken down. I'm interpreting this to mean that Zelaya did not think he could win a vote in Congress, and so is trying to stall. Delays only help Zelaya, since the interim government of Honduras is diplomatically isolated, and elections held while it is in power may not be recognized by other nations.

What a stinking mess. And the U.S. was central in creating it. Had we strongly supported Micheletti from the outset, or at the very least made it clear that other nations should butt out of Honduran internal affairs, this crisis might have been over months ago.

Honduras May Not Yet Be Lost (but it probably is)

I may have overestimated Zelaya's chances. Looks like his reinstatement is far from automatic, but would have to be approved by the Honduran Congress and Supreme Court, both of which ousted him just a few months ago. More here.

Even if the final result is right, forcing this deal down their throats doesn't accomplish much to further democracy. Democracy hit the green in one, and we're requiring a mulligan. Also, it still looks like Zelaya gets back in: countries are already calling the special election, which is over three weeks hence. What a triumph of democracy, when the heads of other nations can just decide not to accept a result they don't like!

Honduran Debacle

Deposed President Manuel Zelaya is allegedly on the brink of reinstatement. This is bad news for the U.S. for two reasons.

First, while Honduras is not exactly the most consequential nation on the world stage, it is in our backyard and may act as a bellwether for relations with Latin America. Zelaya is not only not friendly to the U.S., he is quite friendly with Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, an avowed enemy of ours. While provisional Honduran President Roberto Micheletti was a member of Zelaya's political party, he opposed Venezuelan interference and would have helped keep Honduras neutral. If Zelaya regains power, Honduras will fall back into Venezuela's sphere.

Second, and even more troubling, this crisis demonstrates a profound lack of respect for the rule of law by the U.S. and other foreign powers. Zelaya was deposed by Constitutional means after he was caught trying to illegally convert himself to a President-for-life along the lines of Hugo Chavez (you can see why they're friends). So what conceivable reason could there be for the Obama Administration to support Zelaya over the rest of the government (who were almost entirely united in their opposition to him)? Imagine that, during Watergate, major European nations announced their support for Nixon and that any attempt to remove him via impeachment would result in trade sanctions against and diplomatic isolation of the U.S. Would that not be cause for outrage? The story in Honduras is far more outrageous. Zelaya committed worse sins than Nixon ever contemplated; our influence on Honduras (in the form of military aid and trade) is greater than Europe's on us (especially in 1974).

I'm still trying to fathom the motivation behind our behavior in this crisis. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, "This is a big step forward for the Inter-American system and its commitment to democracy." It's hard to see how this can be true in any sense. Had Zelaya not had foreign support, the "crisis" would probably have ended as soon as he was deposed, and he'd be living off his Swiss bank account on some Venezuelan beach by now. Instead, we've extended and exacerbated the crisis, undermined democratic rule of law, and helped to entrench an ally of our most outspoken Latin American enemy.

What's in it for us? Our interests and our principles were aligned in this case: support of Micheletti would have helped the U.S. That should have made our foreign policy easy. Instead, both interest and principle were ignored in a vain attempt to, what, court Chavez? Maddening.

Continuing Honduran Madness

The Obama Administration continues its maddening course of supporting Chavez-supported wannabe dictator Manuel Zelaya by cutting humanitarian aid to Honduras until the former President is re-instated. National Review is on the case.

Diplomatic Shortcuts

In October, 1956, students in Budapest launched a demonstration against the Soviet-supported Hungarian puppet regime. They were fired upon by the State Security Police and the revolt quickly spread through the capital and, later, the entire country. The U.S., while generally supportive of anti-Soviet rebellion, also had to weigh the risks of nuclear confrontation. As a result, the Western response was mixed: Radio Free Europe initially gave the impression that NATO forces would intervene to help the resistance, but in the end no help was forthcoming. By early November, Soviet forces had entered the country, crushed the resistance, and re-established Hungary as a satellite state.

After the first Gulf War in 1990-91, U.S.-led United Nations troops liberated Iraq-occupied Kuwait and briefly occupied significant parts of Iraq's southern territory. In the aftermath, with the Sunni-majority Ba'ath regime apparently weak, a Shi'ite rebellion broke out in southern Iraq. As in 1956, the rebellion was encouraged by the West, including Voice of America broadcasts. And again, the U.S. did nothing to help when state security arrived to crush the rebellion. It was quickly quashed.

These were not the proudest moments in our nation's history. They represent a natural tension between our national impulse to help oppressed people in need and the facts on the ground. In Hungary, the Soviet Union almost certainly had stronger forces in place than NATO could have ousted without a nuclear confrontation. And in Iraq, the U.S. could only have intervened by breaking the cease fire that ended Operation Desert Storm, probably causing an irreparable splintering in the coalition that liberated Kuwait. U.S. inaction in both cases was arguably reasonable.

A tyranny is like a storm-wracked ship, its passengers constantly imperiled by the elements. Whatever danger they are in, though, it beats actually being in the sea. When the vast American ship of state steams by, stabilized against the storm, sporting a well-fed crew and bristling with weapons, it is only natural that the passengers look wistfully at it. And when a couple of life preservers are tossed over the side, maybe a few will jump at the chance to escape. It is then tragic when the ship continues on, unheeding, leaving those brave few to their fate.

As we are seeing from events in Iran, the Obama administration has internalized this lesson. No life preservers are being proffered this time. He has taken criticism on this from neo-conservatives, and indeed it might be the wrong move. Outspoken American support for dissidents in the Soviet Union proved enormously helpful to them, and did not invite rash dives into unknown waters. But what is going on in Iran appears more like Hungarian and Iraqi demonstrations and unrest than like the Soviet dissident movement.

Honduras, though, is entirely different, and here President Obama has seriously erred. Deposed President Zelaya tried to set himself up as dictator-for-life in the Venezuelan model, and in fact was and is backed by Hugo Chavez. Nearly all of Honduras' highest government officials opposed the move, and took what legal actions they could to prevent them. When Zelaya tried to strong-arm his way past their resistance, the Honduran military removed him on orders from the Honduran Supreme Court and installed the next-highest member of Zelaya's Liberal Party, Roberto Micheletti, as President pro tempore until a new election could be held. Micheletti has promised to hold elections earlier than the scheduled date of November 29 to bring legitimacy to his government.

President Obama, along with most of the rest of the world, is publicly backing Zelaya. This is hard to understand. Zelaya is not pro-American, and wishes to bring Honduras into closer alignment with Chavez, an outspoken opponent of America. So supporting him does not advance American interests. Further, Zelaya now constitutes the leader of a minority resistance. He has little popular support, lacks the support of the Honduran military, and is not currently in control of the levers of power. Supporting him is therefore more likely, not less, to lead to armed conflict of the type Obama is assiduously trying not to encourage in Iran.

In our past mistakes, the U.S. allowed tyrannies to re-establish control over areas that we encouraged to strive for freedom. In Honduras, we have found a simpler way: we are encouraging tyranny to establish control and actively discouraging the strivers. The past often holds lessons for the future. Czechoslovakia tried to break free of the Soviet model in 1968, and the tanks subsequently rolled in. Alexander Dubček, remembering what happened in Hungary, called for his people not to resist. Let us hope that future resisters do not have cause to look on Honduras the same way.